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[Standard workplace conditions that are commonly perceived as neutral and reasonable can 
discriminate against people who find conforming to them difficult or impossible because of innate 
differences in neuronal and cognitive functioning. We use the example of Attention Defi-
cit/Hyperactivity Disorder to show that, for people with cognitive differences, it is necessary to seek 
legal protection from discrimination within a disability framework. This approach can be problem-
atic because of the stigma that attaches to disability and because of the way that provisions of the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) are interpreted. An alternative approach is to treat 
cognitive and behavioural attributes within a framework that recognises different abilities, rather 
than starting from a presumptive position of disability, in much the same way that gender or religious 
beliefs are treated.] 
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I   IN T R O D U C T I O N 
Biases in cultural values and legal systems are frequently unidentified and 
therefore invisible. The result can be discriminatory practices that cause great 
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harm to many individuals but which, because they are unrecognised, remain 
unchecked. An additional consequence of the invisibility of these underlying 
biases is that those affected by the discrimination are often stigmatised and 
blamed for the disadvantages they experience. 
Consciously and unconsciously, people compare others to socially constructed 
norms that are sexist, ableist, racist, ethno-religious and heteronormative.1 
Behind these overt constructions of what is normal lie layers of assumptions, 
which we cease to be aware of over time. As individuals and as a society we 
have come to think that these beliefs — which underpin much of how we think, 
feel, perceive and behave — are ‘natural’2 and in the process we unconsciously 
deny the legitimacy of the way many people experience the world and ignore 
contributions of those who are different. The assumptions and behavioural 
patterns of those with power prevail, systemically disadvantaging members of 
minority groups. 
Our workplaces are set in such a context, and are often insensitive to differ-
ences based on sex, race, disability, ethnicity, sexual affinity, demeanour and 
other ‘others’.3 Workplace conditions ‘designed, whether deliberately or unre-
flectively, around the behaviour patterns and attributes of the historically 
dominant group in public life’4 become the norm. They give rise to ‘conventional 
expectations’ that form a basis for decisions in recruitment, performance 
management and reward, including promotion, and are usually not recognised as 
potentially discriminatory because they are assumed to be neutral measurements 
of performance, applied to everyone. 
Mayes, Bagwell and Erkulwater5 discuss how the design of the physical infra-
structure and cultural conventions — buildings, public transport systems, 
education programs, employment practices — of the modern world were 
established at a time when there was little acknowledgment of diversity and 
when people with disabilities were removed from public life. Once established, 
these structures became entrenched and difficult to replace with alternatives that 
are better designed to accommodate the diversity of human ability. Rather, 
people for whom these structures were never designed and to which they are not 
well suited need special treatment in order to fit in and, as a consequence, they 
appear disabled. 
 
 1 See, eg, Mark Rapley, The Social Construction of Intellectual Disability (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) 62–5; Judith Lorber, ‘“Night to His Day”: The Social Construction of Gender’ in 
Judith Lorber (ed), Paradoxes of Gender (Yale University Press, 1994) 13. 
 2 See generally, Patricia Easteal, Less Than Equal: Women and the Australian Legal System 
(Butterworths, 2001) 7. 
 3 Patricia Easteal, ‘Setting the Stage: The “Iceberg” Jigsaw Puzzle’ in Patricia Easteal (ed), Women 
and the Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) 1, 16–18. 
 4 Neil Rees, Katherine Lindsay and Simon Rice, Australian Anti-Discrimination Law: Text, Cases 
and Materials (Federation Press, 2008) 122, quoting Rosemary Hunter, Indirect Discrimination 
in the Workplace (Federation Press, 1992) 5–6. 
 5 Rick Mayes, Catherine Bagwell and Jennifer Erkulwater, Medicating Children: ADHD and 
Pediatric Mental Health (Harvard University Press, 2009) 101, quoting Frank Bowe, Handicap-
ping America: Barriers to Disabled People (Harper & Row, 1978) 224. 
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An example of such normalisation, and of the perception that certain condi-
tions are necessary or unremarkable — but which are in fact disadvantageous to 
some — is the requirement to work long hours (outside ‘nine to five’) with early 
morning and/or evening and weekend meetings: such a requirement is seen by 
many as both normal and reasonable because it affects all staff ‘equally’; 
Australian anti-discrimination law, however, challenges the ready acceptance of 
such ‘normal’ and ‘equally applicable’ requirements. Women have significant 
parenting and caring roles,6 and so a substantially lower proportion of women 
than men comply or are able to comply with a requirement to work full-time or 
overtime.7 The ‘normal’ requirement therefore has a disparate effect on around 
half of the workforce, and when such a requirement is unreasonable it is in 
breach of Australian anti-discrimination law.8 
This example of women’s relative inability to comply with ‘normal’ expecta-
tions at work demonstrates how employment conditions and decisions can 
invisibly disadvantage a group. It also shows how anti-discrimination law can 
treat a disadvantage as arising from a legitimate difference rather than from a 
disability. The disadvantage that women experience is conceptualised without 
treating women as less ‘abled’ than men. 
We examine this kind of unconscious normalisation in the context of the 
emerging evidence that diverse ways of thinking (cognitive diversity) arising 
from a variety of types of brain (so-called ‘neurodiversity’) are a fundamental 
aspect of human nature. Using the example of attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (‘ADHD’) — sometimes also referred to as attention deficit disorder 
(‘ADD’),9 since hyperactivity is rarely a defining characteristic in adults10 — we 
 
 6 See generally Patricia Easteal, ‘A Kaleidoscope View of Law and Culture: The Australian Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984’ (2001) 29 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 51. 
 7 See Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends, ABS Catalogue No 4102.0 (2008) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.0Chapter8002008>; Rebecca Cas-
sells et al, The Impact of a Sustained Gender Wage Gap on the Australian Economy: Report to 
the Office for Women, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs (2009) <http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/women/pubs/general/gender_wage_gap/Pages/p2. 
aspx#2>. 
 8 See, eg, Escobar v Rainbow Printing Pty Ltd [No 2] (2002) 120 IR 84; Mayer v Australian 
Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation [2003] EOC ¶93-285; Edwards v Hillier [2006] 
QADT 34 (11 August 2006). 
 9 Edward M Hallowell and John J Ratey, Delivered from Distraction: Getting the Most out of Life 
with Attention Deficit Disorder (Ballantine Books, 2005) suggests the term ‘Attention Difference 
Disorder’, pointing out that people with ADHD can sustain high levels of attention (hyper-focus) 
for prolonged periods of time under some circumstances, as we discuss below. 
 10 Here we use the term ‘ADHD’ for consistency with the clinical literature, recognising that this 
may be misleading when referring to adults and that, contrary to the aims of this article, it rein-
forces the view of ADHD as a disability characterised by deficit. As points of entry into the large 
medical and psychological literature on ADHD/ADD, see eg, Russell A Barkley, ADHD and the 
Nature of Self-Control (Guilford Press, 1997); Thomas E Brown, Attention Deficit Disorder: The 
Unfocused Mind in Children and Adults (Yale University Press, 2005); Russell A Barkley, Atten-
tion-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: A Handbook for Diagnosis and Treatment (Guilford Press, 
3rd ed, 2006); Michael Fitzgerald, Mark Bellgrove and Michael Gill (eds), Handbook of Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (John Wiley & Sons, 2007); Mayes, Bagwell and Erkulwater, 
above n 5; Russell A Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults: The Latest 
Assessment and Treatment Strategies (Jones and Bartlett, 2010). For general discussion of neu-
rodiversity and diverse cognitive styles, see, eg, Kenneth M Goldstein and Sheldon Blackman, 
Cognitive Style: Five Approaches and Relevant Research (John Wiley & Sons, 1978); Raymond 
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consider how, as in the case of gender, anti-discrimination law might address 
disadvantages in the workplace arising from cognitive differences, without 
treating those differences as disabilities. 
We begin by looking at some of the characteristics of ADHD, before consider-
ing how these create problems in the workplace and how standard workplace 
conditions — commonly perceived as neutral and reasonable — unwittingly 
disadvantage people with ADHD. We then examine the current legal remedies 
for those so disadvantaged. 
I I   ADHD A S  A DI S A B I L I T Y/DI S O R D E R 
ADHD is formalised as a psychiatric condition through its inclusion in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,11 published by the 
American Psychiatric Association. It is commonly thought of as a condition that 
affects children, mainly boys, and it is the most prevalent childhood psychiatric 
condition.12 However, it is now well-established, although less well understood, 
as a condition that can occur throughout adulthood.13 There are consistent 
estimates of around eight per cent for childhood prevalence from large national 
and birth cohorts in the United States and northern Europe, with boys more 
likely to be affected than girls.14 
Prevalence in adults appears to be slightly lower, consistent with the common 
idea that some people ‘grow out of it’ or ‘learn to cope’. In a recent World Health 
Organization survey, prevalence in adults was estimated to be in the range of 
three to seven per cent in the United States and northern Europe,15 which also 
makes it one of the most prevalent adult psychiatric conditions. 
 
G Hunt et al, ‘Cognitive Style and Decision Making’ (1989) 44 Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 436; Robert J Sternberg and Li-Fang Zhang (eds), Perspectives on 
Thinking, Learning, and Cognitive Styles (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2001); Andreas Ka-
pardis, Psychology and Law: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2003); 
Developmental Adult Neuro-Diversity Association, The Make-Up of Neurodiversity (2010) 
<http://www.danda.org.uk/pages/neuro-diversity.php>; Edward Griffin and David Pollak, ‘Stu-
dent Experiences of Neurodiversity in Higher Education: Insights from the BRAINHE Project’ 
(2009) 15 Dyslexia 23; David Pollak, ‘Introduction’ in David Pollak (ed), Neurodiversity in 
Higher Education: Positive Responses to Specific Learning Differences (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 
1; Scott E Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, 
Schools, and Societies (Princeton University Press, 2007). 
 11 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: 
DSM-IV-TR (4th ed, 2000) (‘DSM-IV’). 
 12 Joseph Biederman and Stephen V Faraone, ‘Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder’ (2005) 
366 Lancet 237, 237. 
 13 Ibid. See also Brown, Attention Deficit Disorder: The Unfocused Mind, above n 10; Barkley, 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults, above n 10. 
 14 See, eg, William J Barbaresi et al, ‘How Common Is Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder? 
Incidence in a Population-Based Birth Cohort in Rochester, Minnesota’ (2002) 156 Archives of 
Pediatric & Adolescent Medicine 217; Tanya E Froehlich et al, ‘Prevalence, Recognition, and 
Treatment of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in a National Sample of US Children’ 
(2007) 161 Archives of Pediatric & Adolescent Medicine 857; Susan L Smalley et al, ‘Prevalence 
and Psychiatric Comorbidity of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in an Adolescent Fin-
nish Population’ (2007) 46 Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 
1575. 
 15 See J Fayyad et al, ‘Cross-National Prevalence and Correlates of Adult Attention-Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder’ (2007) 190 British Journal of Psychiatry 402, 405. 
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Characterised by deficits in attention regulation, hyperactivity and impulsivity, 
ADHD is a highly heritable clinical condition. Genetic factors account for 
approximately 80 per cent of the differences between people with and without 
ADHD.16 The nature of these genetic differences is beginning to be understood 
in detail, and variant forms (alleles) of a number of genes are known to be more 
common in people with ADHD than in other people.17 Most of these genes 
encode components of monoamine (particularly dopamine) neurotransmitter 
signalling systems that are associated with the cognitive and behavioural traits 
(primarily attention and impulse control) that characterise ADHD. Differences in 
brain structure are also commonly found in regions associated with the cognitive 
differences that characterise ADHD.18 
ADHD is defined in negative terms — inadequacy, inability, inappropriate-
ness, failure, etc.19 Diagnostic criteria are couched in the same terms,20 as is most 
of the substantial medical and psychological literature.21 Yet, as we demonstrate 
below, there is good evidence that the condition is associated with positive, even 
exceptional, attributes. 
Unrecognised and untreated, ADHD can have serious lifelong adverse conse-
quences. One of the most notable aspects of ADHD is the range of conditions 
with which it co-occurs, so-called comorbidities. It occurs in combination with 
another diagnosis more often than any other psychiatric condition, and because 
ADHD is usually the first condition to appear,22 it is likely that it is foundational 
to other conditions.23 
Most evidence for the extensive range of conditions that co-occur with ADHD 
in adolescents and adults comes from a relatively small number of studies24 and 
 
 16 Biederman and Faraone, above n 12, 239. 
 17 Ibid 239–40. 
 18 Ibid 239, 241. 
 19 DSM-IV, above n 11. 
 20 See, eg, Thomas Brown, Brown Attention-Deficit Disorder Scales for Adolescents and Adults 
(Psychological Corporation, 2001); C Keith Conners, Drew Erhardt and Elizabeth Sparrow, 
Conners’ Adult ADHD Rating Scales (Multi-Health Systems, 1998); Barkley, Attention-Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder: A Handbook, above n 10. 
 21 See, eg, Barkley, ADHD and the Nature of Self-Control, above n 10; Barkley, Attention-Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder: A Handbook, above n 10; Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Dis-
order in Adults, above n 10; Brown, Attention Deficit Disorder: The Unfocused Mind, above 
n 10; Fitzgerald, Bellgrove and Gill, above n 10; Mayes, Bagwell and Erkulwater, above n 5. 
 22 See Daniel F Connor et al, ‘Correlates of Comorbid Psychopathology in Children with ADHD’ 
(2003) 42 Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 193; Ronald C 
Kessler et al, ‘Patterns and Predictors of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder Persistence 
into Adulthood: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey Replication’ (2005) 57 Biologi-
cal Psychiatry 1442. 
 23 Thomas E Brown, ‘Developmental Complexities of Attentional Disorders’ in Thomas E Brown 
(ed), ADHD Comorbidities: Handbook for ADHD Complications in Children and Adults 
(American Psychiatric Publishing, 2009) 3, 4. 
 24 See Connor et al, above n 22; Kessler et al, ‘Patterns and Predictors’, above n 22; Russell A 
Barkley, Kevin R Murphy and Mariellen Fischer, ADHD in Adults: What the Science Says (Guil-
ford Press, 2008); Fayyad et al, above n 15, 405; Ronald C Kessler et al, ‘The Prevalence and 
Correlates of Adult ADHD in the United States: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey 
Replication’ (2006) 163 American Journal of Psychiatry 716; Stephen L Able et al, ‘Functional 
and Psychosocial Impairment in Adults with Undiagnosed ADHD’ (2007) 37 Psychological 
Medicine 97; Joseph Biederman et al, ‘Functional Impairments in Adults with Self-Reports of 
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is summarised in several excellent reviews,25 with some additional evidence 
available for specific conditions, including obesity, Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder and eating disorders.26 These studies show that adults and adolescents 
with ADHD are more likely to smoke, to abuse and to be dependent on alcohol 
and other substances, and to be overweight or obese. They have a greater chance 
of having Major Depressive Disorder, Dysthymia, Bipolar Disorder, Panic 
Disorder, Social Phobia, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, Oppositional Defiant Disorder, 
Intermittent Explosive Disorder, eating disorders, and Avoidant, Obsessive-
Compulsive, Passive-Aggressive, Depressive, Paranoid, Borderline and Antiso-
cial Personality Disorders. They tend to score higher on scales of psychological 
maladjustment, including somatization, obsessive-compulsive, phobic, anxiety, 
interpersonal sensitivity, depression, hostility, paranoid ideation and psychoti-
cism scales. They also exhibit higher levels of problem behaviours including 
withdrawal, aggressiveness and delinquency. 
In addition, people with ADHD have poorer general health including higher 
body mass index, higher cholesterol and more sleep problems. They have more 
medical and dental problems, including cardiovascular disease, infections, 
injuries, accidents, physical disability, teenage pregnancy and sexually transmit-
ted diseases. As a consequence they make greater use of the healthcare system. 
They also have poorer quality of life and higher rates of early death. They are 
also more likely to have marital and other relationship and social problems27 and 
they have a far greater chance than people without ADHD of going to prison.28 
I I I   ADHD A S  A ‘PR O B L E M’ I N  T H E  WO R K P L A C E 
The current way of viewing ADHD as a disorder is relevant to the workplace, 
as illustrated in Figure 1.29 As the Figure illustrates, in the absence of therapy, 
ADHD results in poor educational performance and hence reduces standard 
employment options. The inherent characteristics of ADHD combined with poor 
 
Diagnosed ADHD: A Controlled Study of 1001 Adults in the Community’ (2006) 67 Journal of 
Clinical Psychiatry 524; Smalley et al, above n 14. 
 25 See Thomas E Brown (ed), ADHD Comorbidities: Handbook for ADHD Complications in 
Children and Adults (American Psychiatric Publishing, 2009); Barkley, Murphy and Fischer, 
above n 24; Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults, above n 10; Megan A 
Davidson, ‘ADHD in Adults: A Review of the Literature’ (2008) 11 Journal of Attention Disor-
ders 628; Biederman and Faraone, above n 12, 237. 
 26 Molly E Waring and Kate L Lapane, ‘Overweight in Children and Adolescents in Relation to 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: Results from a National Sample’ (2008) 122 Pediat-
rics e1; Sherry L Pagoto et al, ‘Association between Adult Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Dis-
order and Obesity in the US Population’ (2008) 17 Obesity 539; L A Adler et al, ‘Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in Adult Patients with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): Is 
ADHD a Vulnerability Factor?’ (2004) 8 Journal of Attention Disorders 11; Sharon K Farber, 
‘The Last Word: The Comorbidity of Eating Disorders and Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder’ (2010) 18 Eating Disorders 81. 
 27 See Able et al, above n 24. 
 28 Michael Rösler et al, ‘Prevalence of Attention Deficit-/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and 
Comorbid Disorders in Young Male Prison Inmates’ (2004) 254 European Archives of Psychiatry 
& Clinical Neuroscience 365. 
 29 Figure 1 appears in the Appendix to this article. 
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educational outcomes30 result in poor work performance,31 often leading to 
unemployment.32 
The experience of ADHD in the workplace can be inferred from the general 
characteristics of the condition. Thomas Brown, for example, identifies the 
following six areas of executive function affected by ADHD that can all be seen 
as ‘problems’ in the workplace:33 
• Activation: adults may have great difficulty organising, prioritising and 
commencing tasks. Routine procedures (form filling, planning, etc) can be 
a barrier to initial engagement in a project or task, requiring support with 
these aspects of work. 
• Focusing: workers with ADHD can be easily distracted, tuning in and out 
of conversations and activities around them. People with ADHD experi-
ence the world as a barrage to their senses — noises, sights and smells rush 
in without barriers or protection. Normal noise levels can interfere with 
their ability to hear conversations or maintain a train of thought. Long, 
highly-structured work meetings can be particularly problematic for people 
with ADHD who need interaction and communication to be fluid and un-
structured in order to operate effectively. 
• Regulating alertness, sustaining effort and processing speed: when re-
quired to work on tasks in which they have little interest, people with 
ADHD can quickly lose energy and alertness and become overwhelmingly 
tired. They are often more effective when engaged with components of 
many tasks at once than when working on only one task, unless that task 
has captured their interest and focus. 
• Managing frustration and modulating emotions: people with ADHD are 
easily frustrated and prone to expressing their emotions in ways that violate 
workplace rules of courtesy and etiquette, although the same attributes can 
make them forceful and persuasive in their communication. 
 
 30 There is extensive evidence of educational underperformance by students with ADHD, including 
lower grades, more failures, more repeated school years, greater need for tutoring and special 
educational services, lower graduation rates and more suspensions from school. See Barkley, 
Murphy and Fischer, above n 24; Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults, 
above n 10. 
 31 Compared to adults without ADHD, those with ADHD are more likely to lose their jobs, change 
jobs more frequently, relate less well to supervisors, are less likely to be employed, are more 
likely to be subjected to disciplinary action, are more likely to be absent or underperform, have 
lower job status and earn less money. See R de Graaf et al, ‘The Prevalence and Effects of Adult 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) on the Performance of Workers: Results from 
the WHO World Mental Health Survey Initiative’ (2008) 65 Occupational and Environmental 
Medicine 835; Joseph Biederman et al, ‘Educational and Occupational Underattainment in 
Adults with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: A Controlled Study’ (2008) 69 Journal of 
Clinical Psychiatry 1217; Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults, above 
n 10. 
 32 See Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults, above n 10. 
 33 Thomas E Brown, ‘DSM-IV: ADHD and Executive Function Impairments’ (2002) 2 Advanced 
Studies in Medicine 910; Kathleen G Nadeau, ADD in the Workplace: Choices, Changes and 
Challenges (Routledge, 1997). 
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• Utilising working memory and accessing recall: although people with 
ADHD may have outstanding long-term memories, they often find it diffi-
cult to process information quickly, resulting in poor verbal and non-verbal 
working memory, with the latter affecting ability to estimate time (dis-
cussed further below).34 Writing long and complicated documents can be 
particularly difficult. 
• Monitoring and self-regulating behaviour: social situations can be difficult 
for ADHD adults, who have trouble identifying important cues in a highly 
stimulating context and thus in determining appropriate behaviour. With 
poor impulse control, they can appear to be quite intense and perhaps be-
have inappropriately in verbal discourse. 
In summary, people with ADHD are likely to: experience stress when perform-
ing tasks that involve detail; be unable to complete tasks without digressing to 
other projects; be unable to plan properly because of their inability to conceptual-
ise time; have difficulty performing tasks ‘by the book’; become intensely, even 
obsessively, concentrated on particular tasks to the exclusion of others and of 
social relationships; be inclined to interrupt and to ‘talk over’ other people; fail to 
fulfil commitments; procrastinate, particularly with tedious tasks; have difficulty 
following instructions; fidget and pace; talk ‘excessively’; and be impatient and 
‘emotional’.35 
Studies of how people with ADHD function in the workplace report higher 
levels of job terminations,36 behaviour problems,37 disciplinary actions,38 job 
changes,39 absenteeism,40 lower income,41 poorer performance,42 more work-
 
 34 Brown, ‘Developmental Complexities’, above n 23, 5; Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder in Adults, above n 10. 
 35 Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults, above n 10, 1–9; Nadeau, above 
n 33. 
 36 See Michele Toner, Thomas O’Donoghue and Stephen Houghton, ‘Living in Chaos and Striving 
for Control: How Adults with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Deal with Their Disorder’ 
(2006) 53 International Journal of Disability, Development and Education 247; Barkley, Murphy 
and Fischer, above n 24; Russell A Barkley et al, ‘Young Adult Outcome of Hyperactive Chil-
dren: Adaptive Functioning in Major Life Activities’ (2006) 45 Journal of the American Acad-
emy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 192; Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
in Adults, above n 10. 
 37 See Toner, O’Donoghue and Houghton, above n 36; Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder in Adults, above n 10; Barkley, Murphy and Fischer, above n 24. 
 38 See Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults, above n 10; Barkley et al, 
‘Young Adult Outcome of Hyperactive Children’, above n 36. 
 39 Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults, above n 10; Barkley et al, ‘Young 
Adult Outcome of Hyperactive Children’, above n 36. 
 40 See Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults, above n 10; Barkley et al, 
‘Young Adult Outcome of Hyperactive Children’, above n 36; de Graaf et al, above n 31; 
R C Kessler et al, ‘The Prevalence and Workplace Costs of Adult Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder in a Large Manufacturing Firm’ (2009) 39 Psychological Medicine 137. 
 41 See Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults, above n 10; Barkley et al, 
‘Young Adult Outcome of Hyperactive Children’, above n 36; Kessler et al, ‘The Prevalence and 
Correlates of Adult ADHD in the United States’, above n 24; Able et al, above n 24; Biederman 
et al, ‘Functional Impairments in Adults’, above n 24. 
 42 See de Graaf et al, above n 31; Kessler et al, ‘The Prevalence and Workplace Costs of Adult 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder’, above n 40; Barkley et al, ‘Young Adult Outcome of 
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related accidents and injuries,43 greater levels of lost role performance,44 lower 
likelihood of full-time employment,45 poorer self-evaluation of functioning in 
teams and greater reliance upon teammates but not an associated acceptance of 
that reliance.46 
Differences in ability associated with ADHD are not physical or visible and 
behaviours that characterise ADHD are experienced by most people from time to 
time so that they tend to be seen as ‘normal’. As a result, tolerance of the 
behavioural differences that characterise people with ADHD tends to be low and 
there is an expectation that they will conform to normal expectations.47 
Since the great majority of adults with ADHD are undiagnosed, they and their 
colleagues have no basis on which to explain these and other similar behaviours 
except in moralistic terms, or as indications of laziness, a ‘willful lack of 
effort’,48 an uncooperative attitude, or incompetence — problems that can be 
fixed through appropriate performance management measures and the applica-
tion of ‘a bit of self-discipline’. 
The problem is compounded by the inconsistent behaviour that is characteristic 
of people with ADHD. Although unable to focus or to persist with uninteresting 
tasks,49 they have an unusual ability for prolonged and intense focus on topics of 
interest and, as a result, they are capable of outstanding performance in some 
areas. This pattern is often interpreted as ‘showing what they can do if they 
really want to’ or ‘if they put their mind to it’ or ‘when they can be bothered’.50 
Most people can focus and perform tasks even when they do not find them 
particularly interesting. It is not surprising, therefore, that they often view 
inconsistent performance as resulting from a lack of sustained effort and believe 
that it can be remediated by an act of will. It may be difficult for them to accept 
that this is not the case for everyone — that the inability of people with ADHD 
 
Hyperactive Children’, above n 36; Barkley, Murphy and Fischer, above n 24; Biederman et al, 
‘Educational and Occupational Underattainment’, above n 31. 
 43 See Kessler et al, ‘The Prevalence and Workplace Costs of Adult Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder’, above n 40. 
 44 See Biederman et al, ‘Educational and Occupational Underattainment’, above n 31. 
 45 See Biederman et al, ‘Functional Impairments in Adults’, above n 24. 
 46 See Graeme H Coetzer and Lynn Richmond, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship 
between Adult Attention Deficit and Efficacy for Working in Teams’ (2007) 13 Team Perform-
ance Management 5; Graeme H Coetzer and Richard Trimble, ‘An Empirical Examination of the 
Relationships between Adult Attention Deficit, Reliance on Team Mates and Team Member 
Performance’ (2009) 15 Team Performance Management 78. 
 47 See, eg, the discussion of expectations of ‘normal’ behaviour from a person who ‘does not look 
different’ in Martha C Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Member-
ship (Belknap Press, 2006) 206. 
 48 Axelrod v Phillips Academy, 46 F Supp 2d 72, 74 (Harrington J) (Mass, 1999), cited in Kristen L 
Aggeler, ‘Is ADHD a “Handy Excuse”?: Remedying Judicial Bias against ADHD’ (2000) 68 
University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 459, 459. 
 49 See Joseph Biederman et al, ‘A Simulated Workplace Experience for Nonmedicated Adults with 
and without ADHD’ (2005) 56 Psychiatric Services 1617. 
 50 See Grad L Flick, Managing ADHD in the K–8 Classroom (Corwin, 2010); Richard A Lougy and 
David K Rosenthal, ADHD: A Survival Guide for Parents and Teachers (Hope Press 2002) 29; 
Martin L Kutscher, ADHD: Living without Brakes (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2008) 25; Rus-
sell A Barkley, Taking Charge of ADHD: The Complete, Authoritative Guide for Parents (Guil-
ford Press, 2000) 46–7; Gabor Maté, Scattered: How Attention Deficit Disorder Originates and 
What You Can Do about It (Plume, 2000) 14–15. 
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to stay focused and perform routine tasks is not something over which they have 
any control. 
ADHD is particularly likely to be overlooked in girls and women,51 and in 
many people’s minds the condition remains associated with fidgety and disrup-
tive boys.52 Girls are more likely to present as inattentive (for example, day-
dreaming at the back of the class) than as hyperactive, and because they are not 
disruptive they are less likely to be diagnosed and treated.53 Solden has discussed 
the serious long-term impact of this relative lack of detection combined with 
greater societal expectations that women perform the kind of tasks that people 
with ADHD find particularly difficult, such as remembering important dates and 
social obligations, managing complex schedules and conflicting priorities, and 
managing time-dependent routine events and schedules.54 
To illustrate how people with ADHD can be invisibly disadvantaged by stan-
dardised work practices, we use the example of the academic workplace with 
which we are particularly familiar, and consider the two primary professional 
functions of a university faculty: education and research. 
Although great changes have occurred in recent years, the majority of univer-
sity teaching still consists of the formal presentation of material to students by 
lecturers, with assessment on the basis of formal examinations and written 
assignments. Students with ADHD are likely to find it particularly difficult to sit 
through lectures, read textbooks, sit through exams and hand in assignments on 
time.55 They frequently have inconsistent academic records, sometimes doing 
brilliantly, ‘showing what they are really capable of’, and failing or doing poorly 
at other times.56 
As adults with ADHD, their ADHD-affected lecturers are likely to have similar 
difficulties, for example in preparing lectures, staying focused, showing up on 
time, marking exams and being consistent in the assessment of students.57 Like 
their student counterparts, they may be brilliant at times, delivering inspiring 
lectures that affect individual students in a life-changing way, but at other times 
they may appear disorganised, unprepared and confusing. The result may be 
 
 51 See generally Sari Solden, Women with Attention Deficit Disorder (Underwood Books, 1995) 44; 
Aggeler, above n 48, 461. 
 52 See generally Linda J Graham, ‘From ABCs to ADHD: The Role of Schooling in the Construc-
tion of “Behaviour Disorder” and Production of “Disorderly Objects”’ (Paper presented at the 
Australian Association for Research in Education 2006 Annual Conference, University of South 
Australia, Adelaide, 26–30 November 2006); Mayes, Bagwell and Erkulwater, above n 5, 18. 
 53 See generally Patricia O Quinn, ‘Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and Its Comorbidities 
in Women and Girls: An Evolving Picture’ (2008) 10 Current Psychiatry Reports 419. 
 54 See Solden, Women with Attention Deficit Disorder, above n 51. 
 55 See Joshua G Shifrin, Briley E Proctor and Frances F Prevatt, ‘Work Performance Differences 
between College Students with and without ADHD’ (2010) 13 Journal of Attention Disorders 
489; Mary McDonald Richard, ‘Pathways to Success for the College Student with ADD: Ac-
commodations and Preferred Practices’ (1995) 11 Journal on Postsecondary Education and 
Disability 16; George J DuPaul et al, ‘College Students with ADHD: Current Status and Future 
Directions’ (2009) 13 Journal of Attention Disorders 234. 
 56 See Shifrin, Proctor and Prevatt, above n 55; Richard, above n 55; DuPaul et al, above n 55. 
 57 See Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults, above n 10; Nadeau, above n 33; 
de Graaf et al, above n 31; Biederman et al, ‘Educational and Occupational Underattainment’, 
above n 31; Barkley, Murphy and Fischer, above n 24; Fayyad et al, above n 15. 
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inconsistent evaluations of their performance. In a system in which lecturers are 
evaluated in terms of mean scores of standard metrics, they are unlikely to do 
well even when their educational contribution has been transformational. 
There is no reason why ADHD-affected lecturers or students need to suffer and 
underperform in this way, to the detriment of both. The tasks students are 
required to carry out and the situations in which they are required to operate 
often bear little or no resemblance to those for which they are being educated to 
perform once they have graduated. There is little evidence that they are better 
educated in this conventional way than they would be using other approaches 
better suited to lecturers and students with ADHD. 
With respect to research, the process of obtaining funding almost seems de-
signed to disadvantage ADHD-affected researchers. In an attempt to achieve 
fairness and equity, granting agencies require the completion of lengthy and 
complex forms with extensive detailed information, much of which requires 
careful cross-referencing and detailed descriptions of research planned to take 
place over a period of several years. These tasks may be prohibitively difficult 
for those with ADHD,58 who, in other respects, may be exceptional researchers, 
and can prevent them from accessing the funds they need to build a successful 
research career. Far from ensuring equity, these procedures, which may be of 
little direct relevance to actual research outcomes, represent a form of indirect 
discrimination against those with ADHD. With an inclination towards divergent 
thought of the kind that often leads to great breakthroughs,59 and a corresponding 
inability to sustain long-term focus in one area, people with ADHD may be 
further disadvantaged because long-term success as an academic researcher can 
depend on the development of a track record of achievement focused in a narrow, 
specialised field of research. 
IV  SE E I N G  ADHD NO T A S  A PR O B L E M,  B U T A S  NE U R O D I V E R S I T Y 
An alternative model of ADHD as part of a broader spectrum of human neu-
rodiversity is illustrated in Figure 2.60 Humans are seen as having innate psycho-
logical heterogeneity, with individual differences in cognitive abilities that are a 
legacy of our evolutionary past. In this model it is not meaningful to think of 
‘normal’ cognitive ability or to measure cognitive ability by a single yardstick. 
In this model, ADHD, as a disorder, is seen as resulting from an interaction 
between a particular component of this neurodiversity — an innate cognitive 
 
 58 See Barkley, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults, above n 10; Nadeau, above n 33; 
de Graaf et al, above n 31; Biederman et al, ‘Educational and Occupational Underattainment’, 
above n 31; Barkley, Murphy and Fischer, above n 24; Fayyad et al, above n 15. 
 59 See Catherine A Corman and Edward M Hallowell, Positively ADD: Real Success Stories to 
Inspire Your Dreams (Walker Publishing, 2006) 159–60; Hallowell and Ratey, Delivered from 
Distraction, above n 9, 20–7; Deirdre V Lovecky, Different Minds: Gifted Children with AD/HD, 
Asperger Syndrome, and Other Learning Deficits (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2004) 225, 228, 
232; Kate Kelly and Peggy Ramundo, You Mean I’m Not Lazy, Stupid or Crazy?!: A Self-Help 
Book for Adults with Attention Deficit Disorder (Scribner, 2006) 35–42. 
 60 Figure 2 appears in the Appendix to this article. 
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style — and the social and organisational environment.61 In appropriate social 
and organisational circumstances, this style may be associated with high levels of 
creative ability,62 insight,63 a strong desire for adventure, novelty-seeking and 
discovery,64 a high tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity,65 and an ability to 
think holistically.66 In this model, ADHD, as a disorder, results when individuals 
with this cognitive style are prevented from expressing their natural inclinations, 
are constrained to behave in ways that they find unnatural and painful, and are 
restrained, disadvantaged or even punished for acting in the ways that come 
naturally to them. This may occur in school systems that tend to be organised and 
designed in a one-size-fits-all manner or in workplaces designed along the same 
lines. 
The model illustrated in Figure 2 provides a framework for the respectful 
treatment of diversity (a foundation of human rights) by removing the need to 
treat difference as disability (particularly where it is construed as inferior, 
dangerous or needy). When difference is treated as disability some people run 
‘aground on the shoals of the two-track system of legal treatment’ because the 
‘special treatment’ they are offered often embodies social and political exclu-
sion.67 Characterising cognitive differences as deficits addressable through the 
law concerned with disability can, thus, reinforce rather than alleviate the 
problems facing those who are different. 
The idea that ADHD is part of the spectrum of human neurodiversity that is a 
legacy of our evolutionary past was proposed by Thom Hartmann,68 and more 
 
 61 See Corman and Hallowell, above n 59; Thom Hartmann, ADD Success Stories: A Guide to 
Fulfillment for Families with Attention Deficit Disorder (Underwood Books, 1995); Hallowell 
and Ratey, Delivered from Distraction, above n 9; Jody Sherman, Carmen Rasmussen and Lola 
Baydala ‘Thinking Positively: How Some Characteristics of ADHD Can Be Adaptive and Ac-
cepted in the Classroom’ (2006) 82 Childhood Education 196. 
 62 See Corman and Hallowell, above n 59, 159–60; Lynn Weiss, View from the Cliff: A Course in 
Achieving Daily Focus (Taylor Trade Publishing, 2001) 10–13; Lovecky, above n 59, 93–6, 218–
21; Edward M Hallowell and John J Ratey, Driven to Distraction: Recognizing and Coping with 
Attention Deficit Disorder from Childhood through Adulthood (Touchstone, 1995) 177–8; Hal-
lowell and Ratey, Delivered from Distraction, above n 9, 20–7; Sari Solden, Journey through 
ADDulthood: Discover a New Sense of Identity and Meaning while Living with Attention Deficit 
Disorder (Walker & Company, 2002) 96; Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59, 35–42. 
 63 See Corman and Hallowell, above n 59, 159–60; Lovecky, above n 59, 93–6; Hallowell and 
Ratey, Delivered from Distraction, above n 9, 20–7. 
 64 See Weiss, above n 62, 10–13; Lovecky, above n 59, 343; Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59, 35–
42. 
 65 See Lovecky, above n 59, 237; Hallowell and Ratey, Delivered from Distraction, above n 9, 20–
7. 
 66 See Weiss, above n 62, 10–13; Lovecky, above n 59, 163, 218–21; Kelly and Ramundo, above 
n 59, 35–42. 
 67 Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Cornell 
University Press, 1990) 146. Minow suggests that law deals with difference through two tracks. 
One track recognises the rights of those who are identified as ‘able’ and capable of making 
rational decisions. The other track grants protection and support to those who are not ‘able’. The 
cost for beneficiaries on the second track is often disempowerment (and even exclusion) as a 
consequence of being labelled irrational, deficient, incompetent and dependent. 
 68 See Thom Hartmann, Attention Deficit Disorder: A Different Perception (Underwood-Miller, 
1993). 
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formally by Jensen et al.69 ADHD is not alone among psychiatric conditions and 
psychological traits in being viewed in this way. Depression,70 Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder,71 Bipolar Disorder,72 Schizophrenia,73 Autism Spectrum 
Disorders,74 anxiety disorders,75 Psychopathy,76 and personality disorders77 have 
all been discussed as manifestations of normal, potentially advantageous 
variation, made pathological through the influence of social and cultural context. 
A  The Positive Contribution of ADHD to the Workplace 
Evidence for positive attributes of ADHD is hard to find in the medical and 
psychological literature because it has hardly been looked for.78 There is, 
nevertheless, some evidence that ADHD is associated with right-hemisphere 
bias, creativity, solving problems with insight, self-transcendence and novelty 
seeking.79 
In contrast, advantages of ADHD are widely discussed in more popular litera-
ture and the published memoirs of people with ADHD, including many in 
clinical practice.80 A good example is the recent book The Gift of Adult ADD,81 
which identifies the five gifts of ADHD as creativity, ecological consciousness, 
interpersonal intuition, exuberance, and emotional expressivity. Other authors 
cited earlier identify other, similar characteristics. People with ADHD are 
 
 69 See Peter S Jensen et al, ‘Evolution and Revolution in Child Psychiatry: ADHD as a Disorder of 
Adaptation’ (1997) 36 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 
1672. 
 70 See Daniel Nettle, ‘Evolutionary Origins of Depression: A Review and Reformulation’ (2004) 81 
Journal of Affective Disorders 91; Paul W Andrews and J Anderson Thomson Jr, ‘The Bright 
Side of Being Blue: Depression as an Adaptation for Analyzing Complex Problems’ (2009) 116 
Psychological Review 620; Daniel Nettle, ‘An Evolutionary Model of Low Mood States’ (2009) 
257 Journal of Theoretical Biology 100. 
 71 See Lennard J Davis, Obsession: A History (University of Chicago Press, 2008) ch 1. 
 72 See Kay Jamison, ‘Mood Disorders and Patterns of Creativity in British Writers and Artists’ 
(1989) 52 Psychiatry 125; Kay Redfield Jamison, Exuberance: The Passion for Life (Alfred A 
Knopf, 2004) 120–32. 
 73 See Daniel Nettle and Helen Clegg, ‘Schizotypy, Creativity and Mating Success in Humans’ 
(2006) 273 Proceedings of the Royal Society B 611. See generally Richard Bentall, Doctoring the 
Mind: Why Psychiatric Treatments Fail (Penguin Books, 2009). 
 74 See Simon Baron-Cohen, ‘Is Asperger Syndrome/High-Functioning Autism Necessarily a 
Disability?’ (2000) 12 Development and Psychopathology 489. 
 75 See Isaac M Marks and Randolph M Nesse, ‘Fear and Fitness: An Evolutionary Analysis of 
Anxiety Disorders’ (1994) 15 Ethology and Sociobiology 247. 
 76 See Linda Mealey, ‘The Sociobiology of Sociopathy: An Integrated Evolutionary Model’ (1995) 
18 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 523. 
 77 See Daniel Nettle, ‘The Evolution of Personality Variation in Humans and Other Animals’ (2006) 
61 American Psychologist 622; Daniel Nettle, Personality: What Makes You the Way You Are? 
(Oxford University Press, 2007) ch 2. 
 78 See Susan Smalley, ‘Reframing ADHD in the Genomic Era: The Emerging View of ADHD in 
the 21st Century: More Complex than Previously Believed’ (2008) 25(7) Psychiatric Times 74. 
 79 See ibid. 
 80 See, eg, Solden, Journey through ADDulthood, above n 62; Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59; 
Corman and Hallowell, above n 59; Hartmann, ADD Success Stories, above n 61; Hallowell and 
Ratey, Delivered from Distraction, above n 9; Thomas G West, In the Mind’s Eye (Prometheus 
Books, 1997). 
 81 Lara Honos-Webb, The Gift of Adult ADD: How to Transform Your Challenges and Build on 
Your Strengths (New Harbour Publications, 2008) pt II. 
     
372 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 34 
 
     
portrayed as adventurous,82 open to new ideas,83 creative,84 divergent in their 
thinking,85 tolerant of ambiguity,86 able to discern complex patterns and relation-
ships,87 exploratory in their behaviour,88 able to think holistically,89 passionate,90 
generous,91 intense,92 intuitive,93 imaginative,94 insightful,95 spontaneous96 and 
humorous.97 They may be highly intelligent and appear to have an unusual 
ability to see patterns and indirect connections,98 and to find, with relative ease, 
solutions to problems that are not obvious to other people.99 They are capable of 
sustaining rare levels of intensity and focus on activities and projects that catch 
their interest100 and they can be infectiously enthusiastic and passionate about 
those interests.101 They can be capable of highly original thought102 and they 
often have a wide range of interests and a great breadth of knowledge.103 
However, these positive traits and the success they can bring are usually not seen 
as part of what it means to have ADHD. A person with ADHD is more usually 
 
 82 See Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59, 434–7; Lovecky, above n 59, 343. 
 83 See Weiss, above n 62, 10–13; Lovecky, above n 59, 343. 
 84 See Corman and Hallowell, above n 59, 159–60; Weiss, above n 62, 10–13; Lovecky, above 
n 59, 93–6, 218–21; Hallowell and Ratey, Driven to Distraction, above n 62, 177–8; Hallowell 
and Ratey, Delivered from Distraction, above n 9, 20–7; Solden, Journey through ADDulthood, 
above n 62, 96; Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59, 35–42. 
 85 See Lovecky, above n 59, 225. 
 86 See Lovecky, above n 59, 237; Hallowell and Ratey, Delivered from Distraction, above n 9, 20–
7. 
 87 See Lovecky, above n 59, 225, 228, 232; Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59, 35–42. 
 88 See Weiss, above n 62, 10–13; Hartmann, ADD Success Stories, above n 61. 
 89 See Weiss, above n 62, 10–13; Lovecky, above n 59, 163, 218–21; Kelly and Ramundo, above 
n 59, 35–42. 
 90 See Lovecky, above n 59, 343, 381; Hallowell and Ratey, Delivered from Distraction, above n 9, 
20–7; Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59, 434–7. 
 91 See Corman and Hallowell, above n 59, 159–60; Lovecky, above n 59, 343, 381; Hallowell and 
Ratey, Delivered from Distraction, above n 9, 20–7. 
 92 See Lovecky, above n 59, 288, 289; Hallowell and Ratey, Delivered from Distraction, above n 9, 
20–7; Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59, 35–42. 
 93 See Corman and Hallowell, above n 59, 159–60; Weiss, above n 62, 10–13; Lovecky, above 
n 59, 163; Hallowell and Ratey, Delivered from Distraction, above n 9, 20–7. 
 94 See Lovecky, above n 59, 235; Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59, 35–42, 434–7. 
 95 See Corman and Hallowell, above n 59, 159–60; Lovecky, above n 59, 96; Hallowell and Ratey, 
Delivered from Distraction, above n 9, 20–7. 
 96 See Lovecky, above n 59, 93–6; Solden, Journey through ADDulthood, above n 62, 96; Kelly 
and Ramundo, above n 59, 434–7. 
 97 See Corman and Hallowell, above n 59; Hartmann, ADD Success Stories, above n 61. 
 98 See Weiss, above n 62, 10–13; Lovecky, above n 59, 225; Hallowell and Ratey, Delivered from 
Distraction, above n 9, 20–7; Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59, 35–42. 
 99 See Weiss, above n 62, 10–13; Lovecky, above n 59, 228, 232; Hallowell and Ratey, Delivered 
from Distraction, above n 9, 20–7. 
100 See Corman and Hallowell, above n 59, 159–60; Lovecky, above n 59, 240; Hallowell and Ratey, 
Driven to Distraction, above n 62, 177–8; Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59, 35–42; Hallowell 
and Ratey, Delivered from Distraction, above n 9, 20–7. 
101 See Weiss, above n 62, 10–13; Lovecky, above n 59, 381; Hallowell and Ratey, Delivered from 
Distraction, above n 9, 20–7; Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59, 70. 
102 See Corman and Hallowell, above n 59, 159–60. 
103 See Weiss, above n 62, 10–13; Lovecky, above n 59, 381; Hallowell and Ratey, Delivered from 
Distraction, above n 9, 20–7; Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59, 70. 
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seen as successful despite being affected by ADHD, rather than as a consequence 
of being affected by it. 
The positive attributes associated with ADHD could provide an incentive for 
workplace change, and measures to reduce discrimination against people with 
ADHD are also likely to enable their strengths to be more fully developed and 
utilised, to the overall advantage of the organisation. Just as cognitive diversity 
was perhaps selectively advantageous to early human groups,104 tapping into 
such diversity in the workplace is likely to improve organisational performance. 
The other side of what is described in the medical literature as an ‘impairment’ of 
executive functioning or a biochemical brain disorder may be a creative genius 
with a ‘richness’ of ‘wandering thoughts’105 that can prove invaluable to organi-
sations and to humanity. 
This alternative view, that the negative characterisation of ADHD is merely a 
contextual perspective of otherwise positive attributes, implies a failure by 
contemporary schools, workplaces and other social settings to adequately 
accommodate and embrace the attributes of people with ADHD. It raises the 
question of how people with these attributes can be accommodated, which we 
discuss in the context of the one area of work-related law that allows for such 
accommodation: anti-discrimination law. 
V  ADHD A N D  AN T I-DI S C R I M I N AT I O N  LAW 
A significant amount of legal activity and related literature regarding people 
with ADHD is from the United States, and the greater part of it relates to the 
 
104 The idea that traits underlying ADHD are present in the human population because they were 
advantageous to some of our ancestors, which was initially put forward in Hartmann, Attention 
Deficit Disorder: A Different Perception, above n 68
 
and Jensen et al, above n 69, 1679, has been 
expanded by Hartmann and others. See Garret LoPorto, The DaVinci Method: Break Out & 
Express Your Fire (Media for Your Mind Inc, 2005); Thom Hartmann, The Edison Gene: ADHD 
and the Gift of the Hunter Child (Park Street Press, 2003); Thom Hartmann, Beyond ADD: 
Hunting for Reasons in the Past and Present (Underwood Books, 1996); Hartmann, ADD Suc-
cess Stories, above n 61. This idea is supported by the evolutionary analysis of one of the genes 
associated with ADHD — the dopamine D4 receptor (DRD4). Analysis of patterns of variation 
between individuals in the DNA sequence of this gene has demonstrated that the frequency of the 
allele associated with ADHD has increased to approximately 20 per cent in some human popula-
tions as a consequence of the action of natural selection: see E Wang et al, ‘The Genetic Archi-
tecture of Selection at the Human Dopamine Receptor D4 (DRD4) Gene Locus’ (2004) 74 
American Journal of Human Genetics 931. In other words, ADHD is common in human popula-
tions because in our evolutionary past it conferred an advantage on people who possessed it, who 
consequently survived and reproduced more successfully. This conclusion is supported by a 
recent genetic analysis of trait dimensions in Mauricio Arcos-Burgos and Maria Teresa Acosta, 
‘Tuning Major Gene Variants Conditioning Human Behavior: The Anachronism of ADHD’ 
(2007) 17 Current Opinion in Genetics & Development 234 and the demonstration that posses-
sion of this allele has a differential effect on general health, dependant on lifestyle. In an East 
African study, ADHD was shown to be associated with better than average health in people with 
a nomadic lifestyle, but with poorer general health in members of the same population who 
practised agriculture: see Dan T A Eisenberg et al, ‘Dopamine Receptor Genetic Polymorphisms 
and Body Composition in Undernourished Pastoralists: An Exploration of Nutrition Indices 
among Nomadic and Recently Settled Ariaal Men of Northern Kenya’ (2008) 8 BMC Evolution-
ary Biology 173. This study demonstrates that genetic variation that is associated with ADHD 
may have evolved because it confers an advantage in one environmental context, but can be 
disadvantageous when the environmental context is changed. 
105 Kelly and Ramundo, above n 59, 47. 
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treatment by educational authorities of children with ADHD.106 There has been 
much less activity in Australia, although the few Australian cases leave no doubt 
that people with ADHD can bring themselves within the definition of disability 
in Australian anti-discrimination law. The definition in the Disability Discrimina-
tion Act 1992 (Cth) (‘DDA (Cth)’) is broader than in some state and territory 
legislation,107 but it is ‘indicative of the general approach’.108 The following 
discussion of disability discrimination in Australia refers principally to the DDA 
(Cth). 
The definition of disability in the DDA (Cth) includes 
total or partial loss of the person’s bodily or mental functions … a disorder or 
malfunction that results in the person learning differently from a person without 
the disorder or malfunction … [and] a disorder, illness or disease that affects a 
person’s thought processes, perception of reality, emotions or judgment or that 
results in disturbed behaviour.109 
This definition provides protection to as wide a range of people who might be 
discriminated against for their (actual, past, future or perceived) departure from 
the norms of human function and behaviour as possible. By way of contrast, the 
definition in the Equality Act 2010 (UK) c 15 (‘EA (UK)’) is less generous; it is 
limited to a past or present ‘physical or mental impairment [which] has a 
substantial and long-term adverse effect on [a person’s] ability to carry out 
normal day-to-day activities’.110 The United States Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (‘ADA (US)’) is similarly limited, defining a disabled person as one 
who has or is regarded as having a ‘physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more [of their] major life activities’.111 ADHD has previously 
fallen within the definition of disability in both the United Kingdom112 and 
United States legislation, but the scope of coverage in the United States (for all 
disabilities, not only ADHD) was narrowed by a series of United States Supreme 
 
106 See, eg, Michael W Sweeney, ‘Working towards a Better Understanding of Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder as a Legal Disability in Employment Law’ (2004) 21 Journal of Contem-
porary Health Law and Policy 67, 68; Drew H Barzman, Lisha Fieler and Floyd R Sallee, ‘At-
tention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Diagnosis and Treatment’ (2004) 25 Journal of Legal 
Medicine 23; David C Wyld, ‘Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults: Will This Be 
the Greatest Challenge for Employment Discrimination Law?’ (1997) 10 Employee Responsibili-
ties and Rights Journal 103; Regina Bussing et al, ‘Children in Special Education Programs: 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Use of Services, and Unmet Needs’ (1998) 88 Ameri-
can Journal of Public Health 880; Robert F Rich, Christopher T Erb and Rebecca A Rich, ‘Criti-
cal Legal and Policy Issues for People with Disabilities’ (2002) 6 DePaul Journal of Health Care 
Law 1. 
107 See Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 5AA; Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) ss 4, 49A; 
Anti-Discrimination Act (NT) s 4; Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) sch; Equal Opportunity 
Act 1984 (SA) s 5; Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 3; Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 4 
(and see Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) s 4, yet to commence); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 
(WA) s 4. 
108 Rees, Lindsay and Rice, above n 4, 262. 
109 DDA (Cth) s 4(1). 
110 EA (UK) s 6; note that ‘long-term’ is defined as not less than 12 months: sch 1 cl 2. 
111 ADA (US), 42 USC § 12102(1) (2006 & Supp 2009). 
112 See Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) c 50, s 1(1), sch 1, repealed by EA (UK) sch 27 
pt 1. 
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Court decisions which imposed additional considerations such as the availability 
of corrective measures, and set high standards for the degree of impairment.113 
This trend was addressed by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which reinstated 
the intended breadth of the definition of disability.114 
Despite its widespread acceptance as a ‘disability’ in Australian anti-
discrimination law,115 ADHD has rarely formed the basis for a discrimination 
complaint in reported cases.116 As in the United States, the few reported cases 
tend to be in relation to the education of children and young people who have 
ADHD rather than about employment issues concerning adults with ADHD.117 
These may still be relevant to the approach of courts to issues of difference and 
disability in an employment context. 
The small number of complaints of disability discrimination from people with 
ADHD may reflect both the low level of diagnosis and the need — for the few 
who are diagnosed — to identify as ‘disabled’. Because the law’s protection is 
available on the basis of attributes such as race, sex, age and disability, and not 
‘at large’ on the basis of prejudice or irrelevant considerations generally,118 a 
person with ADHD who is discriminated against because of their different 
behaviours must be prepared to characterise their having ADHD as a disability. 
From the perspective of the person with ADHD, attention focuses on their ‘not 
normal’ behaviour, rather than on the excessively rigid ‘normality’ of the 
workplace. The law’s attempts to ameliorate this rigidity, through provisions 
which recognise indirect discrimination and which require adjustments to be 
made, do not alter the threshold obstacle for a person with ADHD who has to 
characterise their cognitive function as a disability and take responsibility for 
challenging the appropriateness of workplace arrangements. 
 
113 See, eg, Sutton v United Air Lines Inc, 527 US 471 (1999); Toyota Motor Manufacturing Inc v 
Williams, 534 US 184 (2002), discussed in Nathan Catchpole and Aaron Miller, ‘The Disabled 
ADA: How a Narrowing ADA Threatens to Exclude the Cognitively Disabled’ [2006] Brigham 
Young University Law Review 1333, 1348–63. 
114 Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act 2008, Pub L No 110-325, 122 Stat 3553 (2008). 
115 See, eg, the cases discussed below, where the status of ADHD as a ‘disability’ was not in dispute. 
116 In published statistics about discrimination complaints that are lodged with complaints agencies, 
the nature of the disability is not recorded. Few complaints result in public hearings, but it is only 
for those few that the nature of the disability is known. 
117 In relation to education, see, eg, Minns v New South Wales [2002] FMCA 60 (28 June 2002); 
S on behalf of M and C v Director General, Department of Education and Training [2001] 
NSWADT 43 (21 March 2001); B v Queensland Nursing Council [2002] QADT 4 (6 March 
2002); Turner v Victoria (Anti-Discrimination Remedy) [2008] VCAT 161 (7 February 2008); 
Cordery v Queensland [2005] QADT 2 (3 February 2005); N v Queensland [2005] QADT 3 
(3 February 2005). In relation to employment, see, eg, B v Queensland Nursing Council [2002] 
QADT 4 (6 March 2002); The Australian Rail Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees West 
Australian Branch v Public Transport Authority [2005] WAIRComm 1276 (21 April 2005); Ware 
v OAMPS Insurance Brokers Ltd [2005] FMCA 664 (29 July 2005) (‘Ware v OAMPS’); Commu-
nications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services 
Union of Australia, Engineering & Electrical Division, WA Branch v Western Power Corpora-
tion [2005] WAIRComm 1402 (2 May 2005) (‘CEPU v Western Power’). 
118 All federal, state and territory anti-discrimination laws proscribe conduct on the basis of specific 
attributes. For the federal jurisdiction, see, eg, Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); Sex Dis-
crimination Act 1984 (Cth); DDA (Cth); Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth). 
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To categorise oneself as having a disability can be a significant step for an 
adult to take, and it will be a barrier to using disability discrimination legislation 
for people with ADHD who do not see themselves as disordered, disturbed, 
malfunctioning, ill or diseased.119 Furthermore, the stigmatisation that occurs in 
childhood persists into adulthood, providing a disincentive for an adult to 
disclose the fact that they have ADHD. They may be apprehensive that their 
ADHD diagnosis will be treated as insignificant, or viewed as an attempt to gain 
undue access to special treatment or conditions, and so not rely on it to claim the 
protection of anti-discrimination law. However, as the law currently stands, it is 
necessary to use a disability framework to address how well anti-discrimination 
law operates to protect people with ADHD. We will first consider the current 
operation of anti-discrimination law, before we consider alternatives based on 
difference rather than disability. 
A  Direct Discrimination 
The approach to direct discrimination in the DDA (Cth) (addressing formal 
inequality or disparate treatment) is typical of anti-discrimination laws in 
Australia. It relies on a ‘comparator’ test, proscribing treatment of a person with 
a disability when it is less favourable than treatment of a person without that 
disability in the same or similar circumstances.120 As a result of the High Court 
of Australia’s decision in Purvis v New South Wales (‘Purvis’),121 direct dis-
crimination has been narrowed to be, effectively, protection against outright 
prejudice:122 ‘blanket exclusions and the most blatant forms of discrimina-
tion.’123 As a result, the DDA (Cth) proscribes less favourable treatment only 
when it occurs because of the fact that the person has ADHD. If, as is far more 
likely, a person is subjected to less favourable treatment because of a behav-
ioural manifestation of ADHD, then the behaviour, not ADHD itself, is said to be 
the cause of the conduct and so is not covered by the DDA (Cth). 
The effect of Purvis is to separate the fact of a disability from its behavioural 
manifestation, a quite artificial exercise in the case of people with ADHD. This 
artificiality was apparent in the facts of Purvis, where the person in question had 
an acquired brain injury. McHugh and Kirby JJ in dissent observed that this was 
a ‘hidden impairment’ which ‘is not externally apparent unless and until it results 
in a disability’.124 Of the person with a disability in Purvis,125 they said: 
 
119 See, eg, the discussion of the stigmatising effect of having to classify oneself as ‘disabled’ in 
order to receive the benefit of legislative measures in Nussbaum, above n 47, 209. 
120 DDA (Cth) s 5. 
121 (2003) 217 CLR 92, 119 (McHugh and Kirby JJ) (‘Purvis’). See also Lewisham LBC v Malcolm 
[2008] 1 AC 1399. 
122 Belinda Smith, ‘From Wardley to Purvis — How Far Has Australian Anti-Discrimination Law 
Come in 30 Years?’ (2008) 21 Australian Journal of Labour Law 3, 25. 
123 Anna Lawson, Disability and Equality Law in Britain: The Role of Reasonable Adjustment (Hart 
Publishing, 2008) 155. 
124 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 119 [80]. 
125 In Purvis, the person with a disability was Daniel Hoggan. Mr Purvis was Daniel’s foster parent 
and complained of discrimination on Daniel’s behalf. 
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It is his inability to control his behaviour, rather than the underlying disorder, 
that inhibits his ability to function in the same way as a non-disabled person in 
areas covered by the Act, and gives rise to the potential for adverse treatment. 
To interpret the definition of ‘disability’ as referring only to the underlying dis-
order undermines the utility of the discrimination prohibition in the case of hid-
den impairment.126 
This was, however, a minority view, and, as a result of the majority reasoning 
in Purvis,127 the ‘comparator’ test fails people with ADHD; they are treated in 
the same way as people without it.128 In Ware v OAMPS,129 for example, Mr 
Ware was an adult in employment who had ADHD. He was dismissed, and 
complained of discrimination on the ground of his having ADHD. The Court, 
following Purvis, found that for these purposes, the appropriate comparator was: 
 (a) an employee of OAMPS having a position and responsibilities equiva-
lent of those of Mr Ware; 
 (b) who did not have attention deficit disorder or depression; and 
 (c) who exhibited the same behaviours as Mr Ware, namely poor interper-
sonal relations, periodic alcohol abuse and periodic absences from the 
workplace, some serious neglect of duties and declining work perform-
ance, but with a formerly high work ethic and a formerly good work his-
tory.130 
This highlights the very limiting effect of Purvis: it is quite unrealistic to read 
both (b) and (c) together and to suggest that all the behavioural manifestations of 
ADHD would be found in someone without ADHD. Unsurprisingly, the Court 
found that Mr Ware was not discriminated against because ‘[t]he hypothetical 
comparator in the same circumstances would [also] have been dismissed’.131 The 
Court’s further analysis led it to conclude that another incident did amount to 
direct discrimination,132 but the reasoning is unsatisfactory in not identifying a 
comparator and confused in identifying an unlawful basis for the conduct. 
The effect of Purvis has been to limit the direct discrimination provisions of 
the DDA (Cth) to circumstances where an employer discriminates against a 
person for the fact that they have ADHD. Such circumstances rarely occur. 
Rather, an employer acts on the basis of the way a person with ADHD behaves, 
and acts in the same way when the same behaviours are exhibited by employees 
 
126 (2003) 217 CLR 92, 119 [80]. 
127 See ibid 100–2 [9]–[14] (Gleeson CJ), 160–3 [222]–[232] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
128 For a similar result in the United Kingdom, applying the Lewisham LBC v Malcolm approach to 
a person with ADHD, see R (N) v London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Independent 
Appeal Panel [2009] EWCA Civ 108 (24 February 2009) [42]–[48] (Toulson LJ). Amendments 
in 2009 did not alter the majority interpretation of the DDA (Cth): Disability Discrimination and 
Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Cth). See also the comments in Austra-
lian Human Rights Commission, Changes to the DDA: Disability Discrimination and Other 
Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2008 <www.hreoc.gov.au/disability_rights/legislation 
/2009.htm>. 
129 [2005] FMCA 664 (29 July 2005) [100] (Driver FM). 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid [105]. 
132 Ibid [106]–[120]. 
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without ADHD. An employer may, for example, expect people with ADHD to 
process information in an open plan environment just like their ‘normal’ peers 
and, like their ‘normal’ peers, they are disciplined if production targets are not 
met. On this approach, the reason for the disciplinary action is non-performance, 
and a person with ADHD is being treated in the same way as anyone else who 
fails to perform, without recognising the underlying reason for that non-
performance. However, in these circumstances, provisions which protect against 
indirect discrimination may apply. 
B  Indirect Discrimination 
More often than being subject to direct prejudice, however, a person with 
ADHD has difficulty conforming to workplace requirements because of associ-
ated behaviours. They then have access to a remedy for indirect discrimination. 
The limitations of remedying only formal inequality are well-recognised,133 
but anti-discrimination laws also address indirect discrimination (substantive 
inequality, or disparate impact), which occurs where a requirement that is 
unreasonable in the circumstances is imposed on everyone but has a dispropor-
tionately adverse effect on some. The precise formulation of the test for indirect 
discrimination varies, but it is essentially the same among Australia’s anti-
discrimination laws,134 except under the DDA (Cth) since the amendments to s 6 
in 2009.135 
In Australian anti-discrimination legislation apart from the DDA (Cth), the 
usual formulation identifies an unreasonable requirement or condition with 
which people with ADHD cannot comply, and asks whether or not a substantially 
higher proportion of people without ADHD would be able to comply with it. 
Similarly, in the United States, the ADA (US) test addresses circumstances where 
‘standards, criteria, or methods of administration … have the effect of discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability’,136 and the EA (UK) addresses circumstances 
where an employer’s conduct, the physical features of the premises, or the 
absence of an auxiliary aid, ‘puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvan-
tage … in comparison with persons who are not disabled’.137 
People with ADHD can often point to a workplace requirement or condition 
with which they cannot comply (where non-compliance is construed liberally, 
and in a practical sense138) which is unreasonable in the circumstances. Assum-
 
133 See, eg, Rees, Lindsay and Rice, above n 4, 119–30. 
134 Ibid 130. See Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) ss 8(1)(b), (2)–(3); Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 
(NSW) s 4B(1)(b); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 11; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) 
s 66(b); Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 15; Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 9 (and see 
Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) s 9, yet to commence); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) 
s 66A(3). 
135 Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Cth) sch 2 
cl 17. 
136 ADA (US) § 12112(b)(3). 
137 EA (UK) s 20. 
138 Rees, Lindsay and Rice, above n 4, 144, citing Mandla v Dowell-Lee [1983] AC 548; Australian 
Medical Council v Wilson (1996) 68 FCR 46; Travers v New South Wales (2001) 163 FLR 99; 
Clarke v Catholic Education Office (2003) 202 ALR 340. 
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ing that they are willing to identify as having a disability, people with ADHD are 
substantially dependent on indirect discrimination provisions to remedy dis-
criminatory treatment in the workplace. 
Under the amended DDA (Cth), the notoriously difficult139 ‘substantially 
higher proportion’ (disparate impact) test for indirect discrimination has been 
removed. Whether people without the particular disability can comply and, if 
any, what proportion can comply, is no longer a consideration. Instead, the DDA 
(Cth) is concerned with a requirement or condition, unreasonable in the circum-
stances, with which a person with ADHD cannot comply and which ‘has, or is 
likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging persons with the disability’.140 The 
virtue of this approach, recommended by the Productivity Commission in its 
report on the DDA (Cth),141 is that a person with ADHD has to prove only that 
they themselves cannot comply with the requirement and are disadvantaged by 
it. 
The DDA (Cth) retains, however, the ‘reasonableness of the requirement’ test 
that features in all Australian anti-discrimination legislation, and it remains an 
obstacle for people with ADHD. The type of requirement that will disadvantage 
a person with ADHD is likely to be one that is a ‘normal’ requirement in the 
circumstances, such as timely performance of ordinary workplace tasks. In B v 
Queensland Nursing Council, for example, the requirement complained of was a 
condition which was imposed in the course of registration under the Nursing Act 
1992 (Qld).142 The nurse had ADHD, and the imposed condition — that she not 
be employed where she would have patient contact — was imposed to ensure 
‘sound, efficient and safe nursing’. In very brief reasons, the Tribunal set out the 
negative aspects of the nurse’s ADHD-related behaviour and dismissed her claim 
for two reasons: first, the provisions in the later Nursing Act 1992 (Qld) were 
said to be inconsistent with — and to that extent to impliedly repeal — the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld); and secondly, as a matter of discretion.143 It 
could be inferred from the Tribunal’s listing of the nurse’s negative behaviours 
that it considered the imposed requirement was reasonable in the circum-
stances.144 Similarly, in Ware v OAMPS,145 the Court’s decision to dismiss the 
indirect discrimination claim, although cursory and unclear, suggests that a 
requirement that Mr Ware work to specified standards was considered a ‘reason-
able’ one in the circumstances. 
Observations by the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission in 
CEPU v Western Power clearly indicate how an employee with ADHD can fail 
 
139 See the discussion and cases referred to in Rees, Lindsay and Rice, above n 4, 137–9, 155–6. 
140 DDA (Cth) s 6(1)(c). Cf EA (UK) s 20(3): ‘puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage’ 
(emphasis added). 
141 Australian Government, Productivity Commission, Review of the Disability Discrimination Act 
1992, Inquiry Report No 30 (2004) 319 Recommendation 11.3 (‘Productivity Commission Re-
port’). 
142 [2002] QADT 4 (6 March 2002). 
143 There appears to be no statutory basis for disposing of a discrimination complaint on a 
‘discretionary’ basis. 
144 See Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) ss 11(1)(c), (2). 
145 [2005] FMCA 664 (29 July 2005). 
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in a discrimination complaint because the requirement that he or she perform to a 
normal or usual standard is considered reasonable in the circumstances.146 The 
Tribunal observed that: 
The question of Mr Murphy’s inadequate attention and retention of instruction 
and information are recurring themes in the assessments. One might expect 
some difficulty on the part of Mr Murphy given his condition of attention defi-
cit disorder. Albeit this cannot be used as an excuse for not working properly. 
… The evidence when taken as a whole is that Mr Murphy … [was] an under-
performing employee.147 
The Commission was of the view that ‘suffer[ing] from ADD … cannot be seen 
as an excuse for inadequate performance or adherence to work procedures’.148 
C  Making Reasonable Adjustments 
Under Australian anti-discrimination laws generally, and the DDA (Cth) as it 
stood before the 2009 amendments,149 an employer is obliged to provide such 
facilities as would enable an employee to carry out the inherent requirements of 
the job, unless to do so would be onerous or cause unjustifiable hardship.150 To 
the extent that such a provision operates as an obligation on an employer to 
accommodate (or ‘make adjustment for’) the employment needs of a person with 
ADHD, it is substantially ineffective, and none of the few ADHD employment 
discrimination cases has had occasion to consider this obligation. 
The obligation to accommodate is implicit in anti-discrimination legislation.151 
It is ‘embedded within the indirect discrimination provisions’152 and arises when 
an employer relies on the defence of hardship or ‘onerousness’ in making 
adjustments to enable the person to carry out the inherent requirements of a 
job.153 The principal reason for its marginal relevance to a person with ADHD is 
that it arises only when a person is unable to carry out a job’s inherent require-
ments. That is often not the case for a person with ADHD. While it might have 
been so in B v Queensland Nursing Council it was clearly not the case in CEPU 
v Western Power and Ware v OAMPS where, as is more commonly the case, the 
issue was one of adequate performance of a job, not inability to carry out its 
 
146 [2005] WAIRComm 1402 (2 May 2005). 
147 Ibid [50] (Commissioner Wood). 
148 Ibid [67]. Mr Murphy’s ADHD was not, however, a bar to his reinstatement at the time, because 
there was ‘no record in evidence of him performing in an unsafe manner to date.’ 
149 DDA (Cth) s 15(4), amended by Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation 
Amendment Act 2009 (Cth) sch 2 cl 25. 
150 Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 49; Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 49D(4); Anti-
Discrimination Act (NT) s 39; Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 35; Equal Opportunity Act 
1984 (SA) s 84; Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 45; Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 22 
(and see Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) s 22, yet to commence); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 
(WA) s 66Q. See also ADA (US) § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
151 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 119, 125–8 (McHugh and Kirby JJ). McHugh and Kirby JJ, while in 
dissent, were stating a principle which was not disputed by the majority. 
152 Lawson, above n 123, 3. 
153 See, eg, Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 49(1)(b); Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 22(1). 
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inherent requirements. Thus, before the 2009 amendments to the DDA (Cth),154 a 
person with ADHD had no statutory basis for expecting an employer to make 
adjustments to the workplace that would enable them to perform better in 
meeting the ‘normal’ requirements of their job than their ADHD would allow. 
That continues to be the case under Australia’s state and territory anti-
discrimination laws,155 but the DDA (Cth) has taken a new approach. 
The DDA (Cth) amendments reflect a recommendation from the Productivity 
Commission156 in explicitly imposing on an employer an obligation to make 
‘reasonable adjustments’ that would enable a person with a disability — such as 
ADHD — to comply with a requirement.157 A ‘reasonable adjustment’ is defined 
simply as one that would not impose ‘an unjustifiable hardship’ on, in the case of 
a workplace requirement, the employer.158 For people with ADHD, the signifi-
cance of the amendment is that an employer’s obligation to make reasonable 
adjustments is no longer dependent on a person’s inability otherwise to carry out 
the inherent requirements of a job. In the state and territory discrimination 
laws159 there is a necessary nexus between the implied obligation to make 
adjustments and ability to perform inherent requirements,160 and under the DDA 
(Cth) there remains a connection when in fact a person is not able to perform the 
inherent requirement.161 But when the issue is how well and in what way they do 
their job (as it often is for people with ADHD), the DDA (Cth) now obliges an 
employer to accommodate a person’s needs, unless that accommodation imposes 
unjustifiable hardship.162 
In legislating for ‘reasonable adjustments’ in employment, the federal govern-
ment is giving effect to its obligation under art 27(1)(i) of the International 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’)163 to ‘[e]nsure 
that reasonable accommodation is provided to persons with disabilities in the 
workplace’.164 It is also moving the DDA (Cth) closer to international practice. 
 
154 See above n 149. 
155 See the provisions set out in above n 150. 
156 Productivity Commission Report, above n 141, 196 Recommendation 8.1. 
157 DDA (Cth) s 6(2). Note the amendments also establish a failure to make reasonable adjustments 
as a stand-alone ground for a direct discrimination complaint: s 5(2). 
158 Ibid ss 4(1), 29A. The factors to be taken into account in determining what hardships are 
‘unjustifiable’ are set out in s 11. 
159 See the provisions set out in above n 107. 
160 There have been Australian cases which address an obligation to make reasonable adjustments in 
circumstances where a person needs those adjustments only to be able to better perform, but such 
an obligation has been privately negotiated: see, eg, Husein v University of Western Sydney 
[No 2] [2009] NSWADT 86 (22 April 2009); or has been imposed by relevant institutional pol-
icy: Daghlian v Australian Postal Corporation [2003] FCA 759 (23 July 2003). 
161 DDA (Cth) s 21A. See also the discussion in X v Commonwealth (1999) 200 CLR 177, 190 
(McHugh J). 
162 DDA (Cth) ss 4(1), 11. 
163 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 
[2008] ATS 12 (entered into force 3 May 2008). 
164 Lawson, above n 123, 23–4 traces this obligation from World Programme of Action Concerning 
Disabled Persons, GA Res 37/52, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 37th sess, 90th plen mtg, Agenda Item 
39, Supp No 51, UN Doc A/RES/37/52 (3 December 1982) through to Standard Rules on the 
Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, GA Res 48/96, UN GAOR, 3rd 
Comm, 48th sess, 85th plen mtg, Agenda Item 109, UN Doc A/RES/48/96 (20 December 1993), 
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The provisions in the EA (UK) impose a positive obligation on an employer to 
‘take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take’ to avoid causing a disabled 
person substantial disadvantage,165 and in the ADA (US) there is a positive 
obligation to make ‘reasonable accommodation’ for a person’s disabilities short 
of causing ‘undue hardship’.166 There is now an obligation on all member states 
of the European Union to require employers to ‘take appropriate measures … 
unless such measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the em-
ployer.’167 
The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the 2009 amendments claims 
that the DDA (Cth), in defining ‘reasonable adjustments’ as adjustments that 
would not impose an unjustifiable hardship, ‘is consistent with the definition of 
“reasonable accommodation” in Article 2 of the Disabilities Convention.’168 This 
is not strictly true. The CRPD definition is different, referring not to ‘unjustifi-
able hardship’ but to ‘disproportionate or undue burden’, and specifying that 
reasonable accommodation 
means necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a 
disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure 
to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with 
others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.169 
Allowance for reasonable accommodation does, however, have a problematic 
dimension. The DDA (Cth), and the statutes in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (and their judicial interpretation), have been founded on notions of 
cost in construing what is reasonable and unreasonable. Colker, for example, in 
discussing provisions now in the EA (UK) which were previously in the Disabil-
ity Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) c 50, comments that: 
By being attentive to costs and offering a narrow scope of reasonable accom-
modation, it would appear that the British model is deferential to the needs of 
employers in a capitalistic society, reflecting a conservative political regime.170 
Where Australian courts will turn to better understand the scope and content of 
‘reasonable adjustments’ is not clear. On the one hand, the drafting of the DDA 
(Cth) has a closer connection with the very open approach of the CRPD, the 
United Kingdom Equality and Human Rights Commission publishes ‘guidance 
 
United Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 5: Persons with Disabilities in Compi-
lation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (12 May 2004) (‘General Comment No 5’) and the jurispru-
dence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee. 
165 EA (UK) s 20. 
166 ADA (US) § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
167 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General Framework for 
Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16, art 5. 
168 Explanatory Memorandum, Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2008 (Cth) [29]. 
169 CRPD art 2. 
170 R Colker, ‘Affirmative Action, Reasonable Accommodation and Capitalism: Irreconcilable 
Differences?’ in Marge Hauritz, Charles Sampford and Sophie Blencowe (eds), Justice for Peo-
ple with Disabilities: Legal and Institutional Issues (Federation Press, 1998) 28, 55. 
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documents’ to explain and illustrate factors in assessing what constitutes reason-
able adjustments171 and regulations under the recently enacted EA (UK) can 
prescribe matters to be taken into account in deciding whether a step is reason-
able to take.172 On the other hand, the ADA (US) takes a pragmatic approach, 
defining reasonable accommodation to include 
job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a va-
cant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate 
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the 
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations 
for individuals with disabilities.173 
But the duty to make accommodation has been interpreted narrowly in the 
United States,174 in much the same way that the very definition of disability has 
been interpreted more narrowly over the years.175 The conservative approach to 
disability discrimination legislation in the United States flags an unexplored 
issue in Australia that could limit the protection available to people with ADHD: 
how is the ‘reasonableness’ of an adjustment measured? 
While the obligation to make adjustment under the DDA (Cth) is imposed on 
the employer, it may be that its ‘reasonableness’ turns in part on steps that the 
employee takes to mitigate the extent to which an adjustment is required. The 
very open definition in the DDA (Cth) shifts the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry to the 
extent of unjustifiable hardship caused to an employer, the inclusive definition of 
which does not explicitly refer to any expected mitigating conduct on the part of 
an employee.176 Clearly, the intention of an accommodation provision is that 
‘workplaces must … be adjusted so that they reasonably accommodate workers 
with disabilities in order to ensure equal effective access to the right to work’,177 
but United States jurisprudence raises the prospect that mitigating conduct on the 
part of an employee may be a factor when taking into account ‘all relevant 
circumstances of the particular case’.178 In Sutton v United Air Lines, the Court 
took into account the ability of a person to correct myopia in deciding that they 
were not ‘disabled’;179 similar reasoning could suggest that the reasonableness of 
 
171 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Equality Act 2010 <www.equalityhumanrights.com/ 
advice-and-guidance/new-equality-act-guidance/equality-act-2010-guidance/>. 
172 EA (UK) s 22. See also Disability Rights Commission, Disability Discrimination Act 1995 Code 
of Practice: Employment and Occupation (Stationery Office, 2004) 65–73 [5.18]–[5.23]. 
173 ADA (US) § 12111(9)(B). 
174 See Lawson, above n 123, 82, discussing United States Airways v Barnett, 535 US 391 (2002). 
175 Lawson, above n 123. 
176 Nor do the revised draft disability standards in employment developed under s 31 of the DDA 
(Cth) refer to any mitigating conduct on the part of an employee: Australian Human Rights 
Commission, Revised Draft DDA Disability Standards: Employment <www.hreoc.gov.au/ 
disability_rights/standards/Employment_draft/employment_draft.html>. 
177 Gerard Quinn and Theresia Degener, Human Rights and Disability: The Current Use and Future 
Potential of United Nations Human Rights Instruments in the Context of Disability (United 
Nations, 2002) 64 [5.3.3]. 
178 DDA (Cth) s 11. 
179 527 US 471, 481 (1999) (O’Connor J for Rehnquist CJ, Scalia, Kennedy, O’Connor, Souter, 
Thomas and Ginsburg JJ). In 2008, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub L No 110-325, 122 
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a measure an employer must take to accommodate a person with ADHD is 
circumscribed by the person’s own willingness to take medication. 
A troubling consequence of such an approach could be an expectation that, as 
part of an assessment of the reasonableness of measures required to accommo-
date their needs, a person with ADHD will medicate. It has been observed 
already in Australian law that an employer had less reason for concern about the 
performance of a person with ADHD when the person was on medication.180 
VI  RE C O N C E P T U A L I S I N G  CO G N I T I V E  DI V E R S I T Y I N  AN T I-
DI S C R I M I N AT I O N  LAW 
As the previous section illustrates, anti-discrimination law places ADHD 
firmly in a disability framework, premised on the idea of deficit relative to a 
norm. Direct discrimination is defined in comparative terms, and indirect 
discrimination turns on the objective reasonableness of a requirement. Whether 
directly or indirectly, the conceptual approach is to compare a person who has a 
disability with a person who does not, or against a standard that is ‘objectively’ 
reasonable. The overall approach is concerned with compensating for departure 
from the way people are usually treated. The attributes of the people whose 
treatment is usual in employment in Australia become the standard against which 
discrimination is measured. The comparison is a negative one, and the law 
anticipates that people with an attribute that differs from the norm will suffer for 
it. In this way, disability discrimination laws operate to protect, not to pro-
mote — they endorse a positive view of difference only indirectly, by reprimand-
ing those who take a negative view of it. 
Legislation that prohibits discrimination on the ground of, say, race or sex is 
designed to negate the relevance of a particular race or particular sex, and to 
promote equal, non-differential treatment. The terms used — ‘race’ and ‘sex’ — 
are themselves all-embracing, identifying a conceptual area within which 
discrimination is proscribed. When a person complains of sex discrimination 
they identify as having a particular sex, and they say that they have been treated 
differently because of it. Disability discrimination provisions start from a 
fundamentally different position, where the term used — disability — immedi-
ately establishes a deficit or failing as compared to ‘ability’. Disability is not a 
conceptual area within which discrimination is proscribed; it is, rather, the status 
of being less than ‘able’. The very terms of the protection are presumptively 
negative; at the outset they are concerned with protecting the different status of 
disability, rather than gaining acceptance for a different ability. 
 
Stat 3553 (2008) ensured that the protection of the principal Act extends to people who take 
medication which lessens the effects of their disability. 
180 The Australian Rail Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees West Australian Branch v 
Public Transport Authority [2005] WAIRComm 1276 (21 April 2005) [30], [39] (Commissioner 
Smith). Note that the conduct for which the employee was disciplined was not referable to his 
ADHD, and so his having ADHD was irrelevant to the decision. 
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There is a limit to how far legislative protection of a person’s different ability 
can be compared to legislative protection of a person’s different race:181 quite 
simply, there will be employment requirements a person cannot meet because of 
their different ability while the same can rarely if ever be said of a person 
because of their different race. This understanding is already reflected in 
provisions for sex discrimination: while anti-discrimination law can promote 
racial equality without qualification, it cannot and does not do so for sexual 
equality, where some concession is made for, say, a woman’s strength, stamina or 
physique being less than a man’s in sporting competitions.182 Nevertheless, sex 
discrimination legislation starts from a point of equality, where a person’s sex is 
not a relevant consideration unless circumstances require it to be taken into 
account. In contrast, disability discrimination legislation starts from a point of 
presumed inequality, where a person’s disability — their departure from a 
norm — is the relevant consideration. 
A consequence of this approach is that in the area of a person’s abilities, anti-
discrimination laws confirm broad majority/non-majority distinctions in a way 
that they do not for attributes such as race and sex. Instead of celebrating this 
aspect of social heterogeneity and promoting the different opportunities offered 
by people of different abilities, anti-discrimination laws implicitly confirm a 
person’s status as ‘in’ or ‘out’ of a limited conception of ability, and offer 
Minow’s ‘two-track’ legal system of special treatment183 to protect people with 
disability from the disadvantage they will inevitably suffer. In this way, being 
differently abled is seen as a disadvantage to be remedied rather than a diversity 
to be celebrated. 
When differences are so characterised and explicitly recognised, there is an 
implication that whatever stigma attaches to them has a valid basis. As a result, 
reception of ADHD in Australian law and the workplace involves a conundrum: 
a person with ADHD has little choice but to seek protection as a person who is 
inherently defective, rather than as a person who is presumed to be equal in the 
same way that people are presumptively equal regardless of their sex, ethnicity 
or sexual affinity. 
This characterisation of anti-discrimination measures as a means of redressing 
disability, rather than as a way of accommodating different abilities, is under-
pinned by international human right covenants. The CRPD defines ‘discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability’ as: 
any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the 
purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exer-
cise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental free-
doms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.184 
 
181 Our reference to ‘race’ is to the use of that term in Australian anti-discrimination law as a 
shorthand term for attributes such as skin colour, descent or ancestry, and/or national or ethnic 
origin. 
182 See Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 42. 
183 Minow, above n 67, 146. 
184 CRPD art 2. 
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This is in terms similar to the definition in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.185 International human rights instruments are consistent, 
therefore, in formalising principles of non-discrimination and equality as a 
protective approach to disadvantage. Perhaps it is the authoritative nature of 
human right covenants that sees the vast literature in the field pervaded by the 
same language, which accepts, as its starting point, the need to protect disability 
as a departure from a norm of ability.186 
An alternative approach is possible. The proposition we explored above, that 
neurodiversity is an essential aspect of human nature, implies that neurodiversity 
ought to be recognised in a pluralist liberal democratic state, alongside recog-
nised diversity of other attributes such as political affiliation, sexual affinity, 
gender, religious faith, and ethnicity.187 Thus, we argue that there is a need for 
legal remedies that treat attributes such as those associated with ADHD as 
features of cognitive diversity rather than as a disability. If there is unfair 
treatment in the workplace, it should be addressed within a framework of 
neurodiversity that recognises people as differently ‘abled’, rather than as 
disabled, just as it currently recognises people as differently gendered or as 
having different cultural backgrounds. 
On this approach, the same provision for reasonable adjustments could be 
made from a different starting point, one that recognises people’s different 
cognitive styles without characterising the difference as disability. In the spirit of 
Australia’s approach to creating parallel anti-discrimination legislation for 
different attributes (eg ‘race’,188 ‘sex’,189 and ‘age’190), legislation can identify 
the relevant attribute as ‘ability’. Provisions concerned with ‘ability discrimina-
tion’ would start from a point of equality, where a person’s ability is presumed to 
not be a relevant consideration unless circumstances require it to be taken into 
account. A person with ADHD would not present as an employee with a ‘prob-
lem’, but as an employee with abilities. If and when the person’s abilities made 
work performance difficult, then, and not until then, would questions of reasona-
bly accommodating different abilities arise. For some people that point would be 
reached quite quickly, even before employment commences, because of the 
immediate and significant degree to which their abilities make work performance 
 
185 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1996, 
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). See also United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No 18: Non-Discrimination in Compilation of General Comments 
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (12 May 2004) [6]–[7]. 
186 For an example of this literature in Australia, see, eg, Lee Ann Basser and Melinda Jones, ‘The 
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth): A Three-Dimensional Approach to Operationalising 
Human Rights’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 254; in the United States, see, eg, 
Michael Ashley Stein and Penelope J S Stein, ‘Beyond Disability Civil Rights’ (2006) 58 Hast-
ings Law Journal 1203. 
187 See generally Louise Chappell, John Chesterman and Lisa Hill, The Politics of Human Rights in 
Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 37. 
188 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). 
189 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). 
190 Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth). 
     
2010] ADD/ADHD, the Workplace and Discrimination 387 
 
     
difficult, if not impossible. For others, such as people with ADHD, that point 
would arise much later if at all. 
When that point is reached, it is time for an employer to make such adjust-
ments as are reasonable to enable a person to carry out the job. The obligation in 
the DDA (Cth) to make reasonable adjustments in the workplace191 is a signifi-
cant step towards recognising a person’s ability. But even this advance comes 
from a starting point of dealing with a disability, where the adjustments will 
represent some mediated departure from the ‘normal’ way of doing things. If the 
starting point were, instead, to engage diverse abilities, then the ‘reasonable 
adjustments’ would be to accommodate diversity, rather than to compensate for 
disability. Conceptually and practically, people with ADHD would not be forced 
to identify as disabled but would be able to claim their own identity as differently 
abled. A legislative change such as this, if accompanied by improved understand-
ing of cognitive- and neurodiversity, and of the differential effects of standard 
workplace practices, might go some way to ameliorating the silent but pervasive 
discrimination experienced in the workplace by many people with cognitive 
differences such as those associated with ADHD. 
VII   CO N C L U D I N G  RE M A R K S 
In this article we have used the example of ADHD to argue for a legal frame-
work to address workplace discrimination against neuro-cognitive difference that 
is based on diversity rather than disability. However, legislative change alone is 
unlikely to be effective in changing the way people with cognitive differences 
are treated in the workplace. The limitations of legislation in effecting social 
change, well-documented in other areas,192 will apply equally here. Prejudice is 
reinforced by attitudes about ‘normality’, and attitudes cannot always be 
reformed by legislation. 
A change in language is also unlikely, on its own, to be effective. Bailey be-
lieves that the term ‘capacity’, as an alternative to ‘disability’, for example, 
would ‘almost inevitably be coupled with “limited” or another qualifier.’193 
However, the legislative changes we advocate need to be seen in the context of 
broader trends of organisational change. Other factors are operating to cause 
workplaces to evolve in a direction that is more accommodating of diversity. 
This trend provides impetus to the proposed legislative change and makes its 
effectiveness more likely. 
The workplace is now more diverse than it was in the past194 and a one-size-
fits-all approach to management is no longer seen as appropriate.195 Organisa-
 
191 DDA (Cth) s 5(2), reflecting the CRPD. See generally Lawson, above n 123. 
192 For discussion of the limits of legislation in the area of gender equality, see, eg, Margaret 
Thornton, ‘Women and Discrimination Law’ in Patricia Easteal (ed), Women and the Law in 
Australia (LexisNexis, 2010) 131, 132–4; Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gen-
der of Law (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2002) 151–7, 442–5. 
193 Peter Bailey, The Human Rights Enterprise in Australia and Internationally (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2009) 541. 
194 See generally James O’Toole and Edward E Lawler III, The New American Workplace (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006). 
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tions increasingly recognise the need to create workplace practices and organisa-
tional cultures that embrace diversity.196 This trend is in part a response to legal 
obligations, but it is also driven by a practical need to accommodate people from 
a wider range of backgrounds who make up the modern workforce, and, in some 
instances, it has been developed as a strategic approach to increasing perform-
ance.197 At the same time, increasing knowledge of the nature of human neuro-
cognitive diversity198 and theoretical work demonstrating that diversity can be 
more beneficial to group performance than high levels of individual ability199 
provide further impetus for the continuation of this trend. There is also good 
evidence that it works — appropriate implementation of diversity policies in 
relation to sex and race can result in improved organisational performance.200 
We have used the academic workplace to illustrate how individuals with a 
particular cognitive ability (ADHD) can experience indirect discrimination. 
Universities have undergone profound change in recent decades201 and, as in 
other kinds of work, a one-size-fits-all approach to higher education and research 
management no longer seems appropriate. With the right incentives, including 
the need for legislative compliance, the goal of more inclusive approaches that 
recognise, celebrate, reward and enhance the contributions of people with 
different kinds of neuro-cognitive ability is not unrealistic. 
But academic workplaces are far from typical, and the question arises as to 
whether other kinds of workplaces could be similarly adjusted to accommodate 
neuro-cognitive diversity. It could be argued, for example, that some forms of 
work are inherently repetitive and dull, making them unsuitable for people with 
ADHD. However, routine work is being increasingly mechanised and automated, 
and forms of work that once appeared routine, such as car assembly, have been 
made more interesting, providing outlets for creative activity and resulting in 
 
195 See generally Gary Hamel, The Future of Management (Harvard Business School Press, 2007). 
196 See Sally Coleman Selden and Frank Selden, ‘Rethinking Diversity in Public Organizations for 
the 21st Century: Moving toward a Multicultural Model’ (2001) 33 Administration & Society 
303. 
197 See David W Pitts et al, ‘What Drives the Implementation of Diversity Management Programs? 
Evidence from Public Organizations’ (2010) 20 Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 867; Barbara Frankel, The DiversityInc Top 10 Companies for Global Diversity (20 May 
2010) DiversityInc <http://www.diversityinc.com/article/7652/The-DiversityInc-Top-10-Compa 
nies-for-Global-Diversity/>; Alaina Love, Diversity as a Strategic Advantage (24 May 2010) 
Bloomberg Buinessweek <http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/may2010/ca20100 
513 748402.htm>. 
198 See Pollak, above n 10; Howard Gardner, Five Minds for the Future (Harvard Business School 
Press, 2006). 
199 See Page, above n 10; Lu Hong and Scott E Page, ‘Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can 
Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers’ (2004) 101 Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 16 385. 
200 See Orlando Richard et al, ‘Employing an Innovation Strategy in Racially Diverse Workforces: 
Effects on Firm Performance’ (2003) 28 Group & Organization Management 107; David Pitts, 
‘Diversity Management, Job Satisfaction, and Performance: Evidence from US Federal Agen-
cies’ (2009) 69 Public Administration Review 328; Pitts et al, above n 197. 
201 See generally Paul Ramsden, Learning to Lead in Higher Education (Routledge, 1998). 
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higher workforce participation and improved production outcomes.202 In the 
same way that many employers have had to redefine normal working hours and 
reconsider what had long been believed to be the need for full-time workers, 
workplaces ought now to re-evaluate other employment conditions and inherent 
requirements which are currently seen as normal and necessary. 
Thus, while legislative change is unlikely to be effective on its own, in the 
context of current trends in workplace change, it may be a crucial element in a 
shift towards workplaces that embrace the advantages of diverse cognitive 
abilities resulting in both better treatment of employees and improved perform-
ance of organisations. 
 
202 See Paul S Adler, Barbara Goldoftas and David I Levine, ‘Flexibility versus Efficiency? A Case 
Study of Model Changeovers in the Toyota Production System’ (1999) 10 Organization Science 
43. 
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VIII   AP P E N D I X 
A  Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 1 depicts the conventional view of ADHD as a neuro-cognitive devel-
opmental disorder with deficits (impulsivity, poor attention, etc) that distinguish 
it from typical cognitive performance. If untreated, these give rise to educational 
disabilities, poor functioning in the workplace, increased risk of other social and 
psychiatric disorders, criminal behaviour, chronic illness and early death. ADHD 
is viewed as a defect and its cause is located in genes and developmental 
processes. 
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B  Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 2 depicts an alternative model of ADHD that assumes that neurodiver-
sity is an essential aspect of human nature. Impairment associated with ADHD 
arises from a failure of educational systems and workplaces to recognise and 
accommodate a form of cognitive ability which, under the right circumstances, 
results in high levels of creative thought, adventurous behaviour, etc. In addition 
to the currently recognised costs of ADHD, this failure represents a waste of 
potential. It constitutes an unrecognised form of discrimination and social 
injustice. Paradoxically, in this model, recognition of difference, which is often 
the basis of stigma and discrimination, is necessary for the achievement of social 
justice. 
